Here's a story I was working on for the CS Monitor that ultimately got rejected. Some of the information I mention in other articles, but most of it is new material.
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As the platoon medic, whenever his unit discovers dead bodies twenty year-old Private First Class Matt Roberts is tasked with searching the corpses for IDs and other relevant documents. However, it's not this gruesome chore that stands out in his mind the most after dealing with several execution sites.
The night after his platoon discovered two execution sites in late February insurgents attacked a village that helped Americans find them. Roberts' platoon responded and their approaching convoy scared off the insurgents before anyone was injured. The villagers poured thank yous over the Army and invited them to stay in their houses all night.
"Most Iraqis want us to leave, but these people wanted us to stay in their houses all night," he said. Roberts and many other soldiers are beginning to believe that they've become mediators in a war between rival thugs and criminals.
American soldiers are relatively removed from Iraq's sectarian power struggle, but they constantly deal with its fallout--mosque bombings, murders, and a veritable kidnapping industry. Sectarian violence adds an extra layer of confusion for American troops as they continue their mission to stabilize the country. Rather than directly engaging Iraq's various militants, the Army acts almost as a police force trying to stop those involved in violent or damaging acts.
Iraq's turbulent state of affairs often clouds the route to stabilization. At a meeting of local sheikhs in Al-Dejil, the sheikhs expressed their concern that American road closures indirectly cause kidnappings and murders.
When coalition forces find a suspected IED (improvised explosive device), they stop traffic in both directions until an explosive ordnance disposal team can remove the threat. This can sometimes take hours. According to the Sheikhs, impatient Iraqis often try to bypass the delay and end up in perilous situations on isolated back roads. In a country where ten to twenty people are kidnapped daily, simple shortcuts can prove quite dangerous. Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Vuono, who commands troops in the Al-Dejil area, assured the sheikhs that his troops would start making an effort to create safe, temporary bypass roads while clearing explosives.
Trying to directly curb violence and crime is often difficult due to the size and demographics of rural Iraq. The predominately Sunni Diyala Province has a healthy mix of Shiias and Kurds creating an environment conducive to sectarian strife. The Army's 1-68 Combined Arms Battalion's Attack Company controls the entire province, excluding Baquba, the province capitol. This means that roughly eighty men with about fifteen vehicles are responsible for policing a population of over 400,000 people spread over an area roughly the size of Rhode Island consisting almost entirely of farmland, canals, winding dirt roads and scattered villages of mud-brick homes.
"The only thing we can hope to do is train up the Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army well enough that they can patrol the area by themselves," says Lieutenant Ted Goldner.
When a wave of violence erupted in the Diyala town of Narwhan early this March, the American Army turned to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) for help. Technically the ISF are in control of at least 90% of the Diyala province, which should alleviate the burden of patrolling such a large area. However, Iraqi police told Americans that they'd stopped patrolling Narwhan because it was too dangerous. To stop the fighting, elements of 1-68 CAB were repositioned closer to Narwhan where they could conduct more regular patrols in the area and better support the Iraqi Police.
Most have come to view the ISF as the main solution to Iraq's problems. Captain Casey Harsh, a Marine who works with the Iraqi Army near Balad, believes that a civil war in Iraq has already started, but that it won't expand beyond scattered attacks. In the meantime he says, "I don't think that the insurgency has the numbers to overwhelm the Iraqi Army, nor does it have the equipment."
Even as soldiers take steps to secure the country, it often remains unclear whether their actions will help Iraq at large or benefit one faction while damaging another. On the Jabouri Peninsula, a heavily Sunni area near Balad, American forces have been uncovering massive weapons caches since mid-march. To date the caches consist of hundreds of mortars rounds, small arms, ammunition, IED making material and other weapons paraphernalia.
While everyone is pleased to remove the caches, there's debate on the weapons' intended use. "It's equipment that could be used against (coalition forces), but that will more than likely be used for a future conflict," said Captain Tim Knoth, commander of the company leading the cache search. However, Knoth stresses that this is a move towards stabilization rather than disarming Sunnis on the Jabouri Peninsula. "If there is going to be sectarian fighting or an all out civil war I don't want to think that I'm disarming one side," says Knoth.
While Iraq's combatants continue to remain elusive many believe that attacking their weapons supply lines may be the most effective means of stopping them. "We're at least slowing them down enough to better our chances for when we find them," says Staff Sergeant Derek Bayne.
While American forces try not to get involved in the particulars of Iraq's internal conflict, soldiers complain that Iraqis sometimes accuse them acting as something of a rival Christian sect bent on killing Muslims. This perception frustrates Lieutenant Brad Rudy. "We're not fighting all Muslims," he says. Rudy explains that he and members of his platoon often take an interest in discussing the Qur'an and Islam with locals. "Why would we do that if we're fighting all Muslims?"
As Iraqis become mired in their own conflict, American forces often hesitate to intervene outside of basic security issues. In Diyala, several refugee camps have sprung up throughout the province. Referred to by the Army as Internal Displaced People (IDP), the refugees are a mix of ethnicities: Sunnis displaced by victorious Kurds or Kurds and Shiias who felt unsafe in Sunni areas.
Although Army civil affairs and the State Department sometimes provide humanitarian relief--food supplies, water, and basic medical assistance--the complexity of the IDP situation deters Americans from making a serious political intervention. For example, the Kurds who displaced Sunnis argue that they were originally displaced the Sunnis. Those involved believe that the only lasting solution for the IDP situation will come from within Iraq.
______
As the platoon medic, whenever his unit discovers dead bodies twenty year-old Private First Class Matt Roberts is tasked with searching the corpses for IDs and other relevant documents. However, it's not this gruesome chore that stands out in his mind the most after dealing with several execution sites.
The night after his platoon discovered two execution sites in late February insurgents attacked a village that helped Americans find them. Roberts' platoon responded and their approaching convoy scared off the insurgents before anyone was injured. The villagers poured thank yous over the Army and invited them to stay in their houses all night.
"Most Iraqis want us to leave, but these people wanted us to stay in their houses all night," he said. Roberts and many other soldiers are beginning to believe that they've become mediators in a war between rival thugs and criminals.
American soldiers are relatively removed from Iraq's sectarian power struggle, but they constantly deal with its fallout--mosque bombings, murders, and a veritable kidnapping industry. Sectarian violence adds an extra layer of confusion for American troops as they continue their mission to stabilize the country. Rather than directly engaging Iraq's various militants, the Army acts almost as a police force trying to stop those involved in violent or damaging acts.
Iraq's turbulent state of affairs often clouds the route to stabilization. At a meeting of local sheikhs in Al-Dejil, the sheikhs expressed their concern that American road closures indirectly cause kidnappings and murders.
When coalition forces find a suspected IED (improvised explosive device), they stop traffic in both directions until an explosive ordnance disposal team can remove the threat. This can sometimes take hours. According to the Sheikhs, impatient Iraqis often try to bypass the delay and end up in perilous situations on isolated back roads. In a country where ten to twenty people are kidnapped daily, simple shortcuts can prove quite dangerous. Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Vuono, who commands troops in the Al-Dejil area, assured the sheikhs that his troops would start making an effort to create safe, temporary bypass roads while clearing explosives.
Trying to directly curb violence and crime is often difficult due to the size and demographics of rural Iraq. The predominately Sunni Diyala Province has a healthy mix of Shiias and Kurds creating an environment conducive to sectarian strife. The Army's 1-68 Combined Arms Battalion's Attack Company controls the entire province, excluding Baquba, the province capitol. This means that roughly eighty men with about fifteen vehicles are responsible for policing a population of over 400,000 people spread over an area roughly the size of Rhode Island consisting almost entirely of farmland, canals, winding dirt roads and scattered villages of mud-brick homes.
"The only thing we can hope to do is train up the Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army well enough that they can patrol the area by themselves," says Lieutenant Ted Goldner.
When a wave of violence erupted in the Diyala town of Narwhan early this March, the American Army turned to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) for help. Technically the ISF are in control of at least 90% of the Diyala province, which should alleviate the burden of patrolling such a large area. However, Iraqi police told Americans that they'd stopped patrolling Narwhan because it was too dangerous. To stop the fighting, elements of 1-68 CAB were repositioned closer to Narwhan where they could conduct more regular patrols in the area and better support the Iraqi Police.
Most have come to view the ISF as the main solution to Iraq's problems. Captain Casey Harsh, a Marine who works with the Iraqi Army near Balad, believes that a civil war in Iraq has already started, but that it won't expand beyond scattered attacks. In the meantime he says, "I don't think that the insurgency has the numbers to overwhelm the Iraqi Army, nor does it have the equipment."
Even as soldiers take steps to secure the country, it often remains unclear whether their actions will help Iraq at large or benefit one faction while damaging another. On the Jabouri Peninsula, a heavily Sunni area near Balad, American forces have been uncovering massive weapons caches since mid-march. To date the caches consist of hundreds of mortars rounds, small arms, ammunition, IED making material and other weapons paraphernalia.
While everyone is pleased to remove the caches, there's debate on the weapons' intended use. "It's equipment that could be used against (coalition forces), but that will more than likely be used for a future conflict," said Captain Tim Knoth, commander of the company leading the cache search. However, Knoth stresses that this is a move towards stabilization rather than disarming Sunnis on the Jabouri Peninsula. "If there is going to be sectarian fighting or an all out civil war I don't want to think that I'm disarming one side," says Knoth.
While Iraq's combatants continue to remain elusive many believe that attacking their weapons supply lines may be the most effective means of stopping them. "We're at least slowing them down enough to better our chances for when we find them," says Staff Sergeant Derek Bayne.
While American forces try not to get involved in the particulars of Iraq's internal conflict, soldiers complain that Iraqis sometimes accuse them acting as something of a rival Christian sect bent on killing Muslims. This perception frustrates Lieutenant Brad Rudy. "We're not fighting all Muslims," he says. Rudy explains that he and members of his platoon often take an interest in discussing the Qur'an and Islam with locals. "Why would we do that if we're fighting all Muslims?"
As Iraqis become mired in their own conflict, American forces often hesitate to intervene outside of basic security issues. In Diyala, several refugee camps have sprung up throughout the province. Referred to by the Army as Internal Displaced People (IDP), the refugees are a mix of ethnicities: Sunnis displaced by victorious Kurds or Kurds and Shiias who felt unsafe in Sunni areas.
Although Army civil affairs and the State Department sometimes provide humanitarian relief--food supplies, water, and basic medical assistance--the complexity of the IDP situation deters Americans from making a serious political intervention. For example, the Kurds who displaced Sunnis argue that they were originally displaced the Sunnis. Those involved believe that the only lasting solution for the IDP situation will come from within Iraq.

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